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ESTATE PLANNING—A RACE TO THE POORHOUSE: SHOULD
GUARDIANS1 HAVE A DUTY TO IMPOVERISH THEIR WARDS2 FOR
ASSET PROTECTION PURPOSES THEREBY PRESERVING ASSETS FOR
HEIRS?
INTRODUCTION
Imagine working your entire life and planning to leave your
assets to your loved ones only to have those assets completely de
pleted by the cost of long-term care. This is not an unrealistic sce
nario and is faced by people young and old.3 So-called “Medicaid
planning” is one means people use to legally divest themselves of
their assets, which accomplishes the dual purpose of creating Medi
caid eligibility and protecting their assets so they may be distributed
to loved ones.4
Donald Domey, for example, suffered a stroke in October 2003
that left him completely incapacitated.5 Because of Donald’s
mental incapacity, he was placed under guardianship and moved
into a long-term care facility.6 Donald’s estate was valued at
$730,000 in total assets, with about $353,177 consisting of liquid as
sets and the remaining $385,500 consisting primarily of the marital
1. In most states, guardian refers to a substitute decision maker for both person
and property. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE LAW OF LATER-LIFE HEALTH CARE AND
DECISION MAKING 159-160 (2006). Yet other states use the terms “conservator” and
“conservatorship” to refer to a substitute decision maker regarding an individual’s
property. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5-101(2) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 464-A:2(IX) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:13A-1 (West 1983); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 81.03(a) (McKinney 2006). For purposes of this note “guardian” and
“guardianship” will include the duties of a “conservator” or “conservatorship.” Id.
2. “The incapacitated individual, for whom a guardian or conservator has been
appointed, is often referred to as the ‘ward’ although some states have adopted the
nomenclature of ‘incapacitated person,’ with a few states retaining the older term ‘in
competent.’” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 160; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5
101(22) (2008) (using the term “[p]rotected person”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:2
(XVI) (2004) (using the term “[w]ard”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:1-2 (West 2007) (provid
ing definitions for “[i]ncapacitated individual” and “[w]ard”). For purposes of this
Note, “ward” will refer to an incapacitated individual who has an appointed guardian.
3. See infra Part I.A. (noting that over 1.6 million individuals reside in nursing
homes) and Part I.C. (discussing the costs of nursing home care and private pay
methods).
4. See infra Part II.B. (discussing Medicaid planning and strategies).
5. In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 730 (N.H. 2008).
6. Id.
251
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home and other real estate.7 By October 2005, only two years after
Donald’s stroke, the care provided by the nursing home “had
eroded the liquid assets of the estate, leaving [only] $75,000,” ren
dering Donald eligible for Medicaid shortly thereafter.8
Donald’s wife argued that Donald’s guardians owed her a duty
of support.9 The court disagreed and noted that the “primary ob
jective [of a guardian] is to protect the well-being of the ward,” and
the guardian’s “primary duty . . . is to protect the estate’s assets in
order to apply them for the support and care of the ward.”10 The
court further noted that a guardian would owe a duty to Donald’s
wife only “when there is a showing of need and when there are
‘more than sufficient’ resources to provide” for Donald’s care.11
The court in In re Guardianship of Domey, held that a guardian has
no duty to impoverish their ward to obtain Medicaid eligibility so
that assets can be protected and distributed to others.12 Rather, the
guardian “has the option to . . . engage in estate planning.”13
Concerns about paying for the costs of care and distributing
assets are not merely for the elderly.14 Bipin Shah was not yet fifty
years old when he was seriously injured at work, subsequently be
came comatose, and diagnosed as unlikely to improve15 Bipin’s
wife was appointed as his guardian and sought to transfer his assets
to herself, which would have enabled Bipin to qualify for Medi
caid.16 The court recognized “that any person in [this] condition
would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as op
posed to his family.”17 The court held “that a guardian spouse is
7. Id. at 731.
8. Id. at 732.
9. Id. at 733. Donald’s wife specifically argued that N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546
A:2 (2007) when read in conjunction with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26(I) (2004),
imposed a duty on the guardians “to perform all other duties required by law,” and thus
the guardian had a legal duty to support the ward’s spouse. Id. (quoting N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26(I) (2004)); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (2007).
10. Domey, 960 A.2d at 733.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 733-34.
13. Id. at 734.
14. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998) (noting that a “[s]ixteen-year-old
. . . suffered massive brain damage and was permanently disabled” in a motorcycle
accident and was ultimately placed in a nursing home care). But see infra Part I.A
(noting that nursing home residents are mostly elderly).
15. In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1094-95 (N.Y. 2000).
16. Id. at 1095. Although Bipin was not in a nursing home, his care was ex
tremely expensive (about $1,600 per day). Id.
17. Id. at 1099 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (App.
Div. 1999)).
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permitted to [engage in] Medicaid planning . . . pursuant to Mental
Hygiene Law article 81.”18
In fact, the Shah court specifically noted that the potential
powers of a guardian are “not contingent on the particular purpose
for the transfer [and] the guardian can make gifts, provide support
for dependents and, simultaneously, apply for government bene
fits.”19 Still, despite the broad range of potential authority given to
guardians, the court declined to impose a duty on them to engage in
planning to protect the ward’s assets.20
Although each state provides its own laws governing guardian
duties and powers, a court may authorize guardians to engage in
estate planning and Medicaid planning on behalf of their wards.21
Currently there is a wide degree of variance among the states.
While some states impose a duty on guardians to propose a Medi
caid spend-down, other states do not impose a duty, but instead
have a presumption in favor of approving a spend-down. Still other
states are incredibly hesitant to authorize guardian proposed spend
downs.22
This Note argues that guardians should have a duty to petition
the court for approval of a Medicaid spend-down when the ward
requires indefinite nursing home care. Imposing a duty on guardi
ans ensures that vulnerable individuals (the wards) facing ruinously
expensive nursing home costs receive adequate protection—
namely, the ability to preserve assets for loved ones while still fi
nancing the costs of long-term care. Moreover, imposing a duty on
guardians potentially enables the wards to dispose of their property
as a competent individual would, while ensuring that the courts re
tain adequate flexibility and discretion to approve or disapprove
the proposed spend-down based on the state’s current guardianship
laws.
Part I of this Note provides background on Medicaid, nursing
home care costs, and methods of financing nursing home care
through both private-pay and government benefits. Part II pro
vides background on the current Medicaid transfer laws, Medicaid
18. Id. at 1098-99; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (McKinney 2006).
19. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1099.
20. Id. at 1099 (indicating that the statute provides that a court may authorize
guardians to engage in Medicaid planning); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21.
21. See infra Appendix (providing citations for guardian statutes); see also infra
Part II.D.
22. Infra Part II.D. (discussing the laws of different states as they apply to guard
ian proposed Medicaid planning).
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planning strategies, and provides an overview of Medicaid planning
initiated by guardians. Part III argues that imposing a duty on
guardians to propose Medicaid spend-downs is necessary to achieve
adequate protection for the ward facing an indefinite term of nurs
ing home care.
I. MEDICAID

AND ITS

APPLICABILITY

TO

NURSING HOME CARE

A. Medicaid and Nursing Homes
Medicaid was first enacted in 1965 and is a joint, federal-state
funded program that provides medical insurance for those who
meet specified eligibility standards.23 The federal Medicaid statute
establishes general guidelines for the program, which is adminis
tered by each participating state.24 Because the states administer
their plans in accordance with the general federal regulations, the
interpretation and application of the federal rules vary with each
jurisdiction.25 The way “Medicaid operates in any particular state
can be answered only by careful examination of the state law, regu
lations, and state program manuals as well as the actual enforce
ment of those rules.”26 Although each state plan varies, no state
plan can be more restrictive or provide fewer benefits than the fed
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2010); JULIE STONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
33593, MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR LONG-TERM CARE: ELIGIBILITY, ASSET TRANSFERS,
AND ESTATE RECOVERY 1 (2008) (“Medicaid . . . covers about 57 million people across
the nation, including children and families, persons with disabilities, pregnant women,
and the elderly.”); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128 (noting specifically that on average
states pay for about half the costs of Medicaid); see also Medicaid Rules, ELDER L.
ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/Elder_Info/Elder_Article.asp?id=2751 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing important general information about Medicaid which
was contributed by practicing attorneys throughout the United States). See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005 1 (2005)
[hereinafter MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE], available at http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidData
SourcesGenInfo/downloads/maag2005.pdf.
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152,
124 Stat. 1029, contains an individual mandate that expands Medicaid coverage, thereby
compelling states to provide Medicaid benefits to significant numbers of people. Flor
ida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256,
1265 (N.D. Fla. 2011), reversed in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132
S. Ct. 604 (2011). The constitutionality of this legislation, which could affect long-term
care eligibility requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 is being examined by the
Supreme Court as of the publication date of this Note.
24. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006); JEFF SADLER, THE LONG-TERM CARE
HANDBOOK 75-80 (1996) (providing information about the joint federal-state laws);
MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 23.
25. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128.
26. Id.
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eral law requires.27 In fact, long-term care28 is one service each
state’s Medicaid plan must provide.29
Nursing homes are the institutions most often identified with
long-term care.30 In fact, over 1.6 million individuals (most elderly)
reside in nursing homes.31 Nursing homes provide long-term care
to a range of residents from those with chronic conditions, to those
requiring shorter-term care for recovery after hospitalization.32
27. “The Federal Government shares the costs of Medicaid with States that elect
to participate in the program. In return, participating States are to comply with require
ments imposed by the Act and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.” At
kins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986); accord Pharmcare Okla., Inc. v. State
Health Care Auth., 152 P.3d 267, 269-70 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that if a state
chooses to participate in the Medicaid program it must comply with federal statutes and
regulations).
For example, each state must contain certain mandatory provisions of the federal
statute including: the mandatory statewide effect of a program; the types and amounts
of medical assistance; and reasonable standards for determining eligibility and the ex
tent of medical assistance needed. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006); see also 79 AM. JUR. 2D
Welfare § 34 (2008) (listing specific services states must provide). Additionally, Medi
caid eligibility, care, and services must be provided in a manner consistent with the best
interests of recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (2006). See generally 79 AM. JUR. 2D
Welfare § 36 (2008); Medicaid Eligibility, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV.
(Aug. 11, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/01_Overview.asp
(discussing generally Medicaid eligibility).
28. “Long-term care refers to a wide range of supportive and health services for
persons who have lost the capacity for self-care due to illness, cognitive disorders, or a
physically disabling condition.” STONE, supra note 23, at 1 n.1. Examples of medical
conditions that create the need for long-term care include dementia, strokes, or cardio
vascular disorders. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 93. The goal of long-term care is palliative
(rather than curative), which aims to maintain the patient’s level of care and provide
comfort. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); see 79 AM. JUR. 2D Welfare § 34 (2008) (listing spe
cific services states must provide, including nursing facility services).
30. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72. The federal law defines the term “nursing home”
as “an institution that provides skilled nursing care or rehabilitation services for injured,
disabled, or sick persons.” Id. at 72; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (providing a more
detailed definition of nursing home). The federal law notes that nursing facilities pro
vide health-related care and services above the level of room and board to individuals
who require it due to their mental and physical condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1)(C).
See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 63 (providing definitions and discussion of other
long-term housing options, like assisted living, that provide a lower level of care than
nursing homes).
31. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72. In fact, “[fifteen percent] of all residents were
under the age of 65” and the average age of residents is about 83 years old. METLIFE
MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, MARKET SURVEY OF LONG-TERM CARE COSTS 6 (Oct.
2009), available at http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi
market-survey-nursing-home-assisted-living.pdf.
32. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 6. Only a nursing
home may offer skilled nursing care, which is defined by the federal regulations as care
“so inherently complex that it can be safely and effectively performed only by, or under
the supervision of, professional or technical personnel.” 42 C.F.R. § 409.32(a) (2010).
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While nursing homes are eager to fill beds, admission is contingent
upon the individual’s insurance coverage and the nursing home
agreeing to provide care.33 Generally, many nursing homes prefer
private-pay patients because they can charge more for providing
the same services than Medicaid will usually reimburse.34
B. Federal and State Government Concerns
Because their residents are in such vulnerable condition, nurs
ing homes are highly regulated by both state and federal govern
ments.35 Since a nursing home cannot operate without a state
license, states are able to regulate nursing home operations through
their licensing authority.36 Additionally, the federal government
has considerable influence over nursing home operations through
Medicaid reimbursement programs37 as “[o]nly a small minority of
nursing homes do not accept or rely upon Medicaid . . . .”38 Conse
quently, if a nursing home relying on Medicaid reimbursements
fails to comply with federal regulations, it could lose its reimburse
ment and, as a result, face financial disaster.39
By contrast, assisted living facilities provide only custodial care, which “help[s] with the
activities of daily living” such as dressing, eating, bathing, and mobility “that can be
provided by nonmedical personnel.” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 121; see STONE, supra
note 23, at 1 n.2.
33. See FROLIK, supra note 1, at 121 See generally SADLER, supra note 24, at 51
55; METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, Since You Care: Making the Nursing Home
Choice, METLIFE (2006), available at http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publica
tions/since-you-care-guides/mmi-making-nursing-home-care-choice.pdf (providing fur
ther discussion on choosing a nursing home).
34. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75. While a nursing home has the right to accept
only private-pay patients, this is impractical for most facilities, and they will be unable
to fill their beds if they do not accept some Medicaid patients. Id. Some states prevent
nursing homes from giving preference to private pay patients and require a certain
number of Medicaid patients to be admitted. Id. at 76.
35. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 74; see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.35 (2010) (requiring that
nursing homes provide “nourishing, palatable, well-balanced” meals); 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.40 (2010) (requiring nursing home residents to be examined by a physician
regularly).
36. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75.
37. Id. This author would like to note that federal Medicare reimbursements also
ensure compliance with federal regulations, however, this Note focuses entirely on
Medicaid; a discussion of Medicare is beyond the scope of this Note. For additional
information on Medicare, see generally FROLIK, supra note 1 at 1-40; 70C AM. JUR. 2D
Social Security & Medicare §§ 2044-2682 (2008) (providing a detailed outline of Medi
care eligibility, payment and claims for benefits, and appeals process).
38. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75.
39. Id. The concern over losing federal funding is highly relevant as residents
have over half of their care paid for by Medicaid. Id.
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C. Covering the Costs of Nursing Home Care: Private-Pay
Nursing home care is costly and individual residents must find
a way to pay for their care.40 On average, nursing home care costs
approximately “$5,000 to $8,000 or more a month.”41 A 2009 MetLife survey of selected nursing homes noted a national average rate
for a semi-private room of $198 daily or $72,270 annually; these
figures indicate a 3.7% increase from the average rates in 2007.42
40. See, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (noting that the ward had about “$78,725 in assets, a monthly income of
$980.97, and a monthly deficit of $4,377.78” and her guardians alleged that the ward
“would deplete all of her assets to pay for her nursing expenses in 10.64 months”); In re
Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731-32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that in December
2004 the ward had over $730,000 in assets with a monthly income of about $5,700, but
the costs of the ward’s care quickly depleted his assets and he qualified for Medicaid
about two years later); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 911-12 (N.J. 2004) (noting that the
ward’s “monthly nursing home expenses [were] $6,500”); In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335, 336
(N.J. App. Div. 1998) (noting that while the ward “was treated at the Morris Hills Mul
ticare Center” the cost of care was “$10,000 per month”); In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82,
83 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that the ward’s hospital “care amounts to over $1,000 per
day” with a private pay rate “of $1,608.13 per day”) aff’d, 95 N.E.2d 148 (2000); In re
John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330 (App. Div. 1996) (approving a proposed Medicaid spenddown which left the ward “with approximately $150,000 in assets . . . together with [an]
annual income [of] (approximately $33,000) which was enough to cover the ward’s nurs
ing home costs for only 36 months”).
41. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94. See, e.g., 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 520.016 (2009)
(providing the relevant asset limitations in Massachusetts); see also, e.g., 20 KATE MC
EVOY, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE, CONNECTICUT ELDER LAW § 7:17 (2011) (setting forth
Connecticut’s Medicaid asset limitations as provided by the Department of Social Ser
vices’ Uniform Policy Manual). See generally State Information, ELDER L. ANSWERS
(2008), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/ (providing information about each state’s av
erage monthly cost for nursing home care, under the “state information” heading,
which provides a link to “key Medicaid information” for each state once the drop-down
menu for a particular state is selected).
42. Compare METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 4-5, 14-19
(noting that the average daily rate for nursing home care in a semi-private room is
$198), with STONE, supra note 23, at 2 & n.3 (noting that the average daily rate for a
semi-private room was $189 according to a MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home
and Assisted Living Costs published in 2007).
The cost of $198 per day is an average cost, so some nursing homes may have
higher or lower daily rates. See, e.g., State Information, supra note 41 (noting that the
average monthly cost of nursing home care in New York is approximately $9,500 (about
$316 per day) which is above average, while the average monthly cost in Idaho is $5,994
(about $197 per day) which is below average).
Similarly, a MetLife Market Survey noted that the highest daily rate for a semi
private room in a New York nursing home is $500 with a state average of $323, which is
still well above the national average. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra
note 31, at 17. By contrast, the highest daily rate for a semi-private room in a Missouri
nursing home is $179, with a state average of $134, both numbers being well below the
national average. Id.

258

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:251

Although nursing home care is costly, individuals may still look to
several private-pay options to cover these expenses.43
One option for financing nursing home care is through sources
of private-pay such as personal savings, annuities, refinancing the
home, reverse mortgages, or selling the home, to name a few.44 For
individuals who resort to paying through personal savings, some
may be able to bear the cost; however, by purchasing the level of
care they desire, they will greatly deplete or completely exhaust
their savings.45 On the other hand, if the individuals have only
modest savings, they may be “house rich,” and the sale of their
homes can create a pool of funds that will often meet the costs of
nursing home care for some period of time.46 In either case, it is
apparent that private funding alone is insufficient to finance nursing
home care if people do not wish to deplete their savings.
Another option for financing nursing home care is long-term
care insurance.47 In general, these “policies pay benefits when the
insured has physical or mental impairments significant enough to
require daily assistance.”48 However, most people are unable to fi
nance their entire cost of long-term care with long-term care insur
ance, because the daily cost of nursing home care almost always
43. See Paying for Long-Term Care, MEDICARE.GOV (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.
medicare.gov/longtermcare/static/PayingOverview.asp (listing and providing the costs
and risks of several private-pay options which include: personal savings, long-term care
insurance, and reverse mortgages, to name a few).
44. See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94-154 (providing in depth description
and use of private pay methods for nursing home patients).
45. Id. at 94; see, e.g., supra note 40 (providing examples of how quickly the costs
of care can exhaust the ward’s assets).
46. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95.
47. Id. at 117. It is estimated that private insurance pays about 7.2% of the na
tional long-term care costs. National Spending on Long-Term Care, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 12, 2010, 6:27 PM), http://www.longtermcare.gov/
LTC/Main_Site/Paying/Private_Financing/LTC_Insurance/Buying.aspx; see also
FROLIK, supra note 1, at 112-27 (providing a more detailed discussion on long-term
insurance benefits); MetLife Mature Market Institute, Purchasing Long-Term Care In
surance: Ten Key Considerations, METLIFE (2009), available at http://www.metlife.com/
assets/cao/mmi/publications/helpful-hints/mmi-puchasing-long-term-care-insurance-ge
neric.pdf (providing general information about long-term care insurance and important
considerations before purchasing a policy); Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAIC,
http://naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing general infor
mation about long-term care insurance and links to each state’s department of
insurance).
48. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 117. See id. at 120 for more specific information on
the required physical or mental deficits. Some policies pay a fixed per-diem amount for
every day the insured qualifies for benefits and lives in a nursing home, some policies
pay a percentage of the daily rate for a pre-set daily limit, and other policies pay all
costs for a specified period of time. Id. at 117.
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exceeds the daily benefit paid by the policy.49 Moreover, before
issuing a policy, the insurer will require the insured to have a physi
cal examination,50 which enables the insurance company to assess
the risk in insuring a particular individual based on age and pre
existing medical conditions.51 Individuals must balance the costs of
buying long-term care insurance early in life and paying premiums
for many years against the possibility of delaying the purchase and
being denied coverage due to health problems and old age.52 In
any case, long-term care insurance, by itself, will likely be insuffi
cient to cover the complete costs of nursing home care.
D. Covering the Costs of Nursing Home Care: Medicaid
The final option for financing nursing home care is govern
ment-subsidized benefits. Medicaid is the most popular means for
financing nursing home care.53 In fact, Medicaid is “the largest sin
gle source of financing for long-term care,”54 “paying for almost
half of all long-term care spending in the United States.”55 Medi
caid typically covers the costs of nursing home care in excess of the
amount that a Medicaid-eligible individual is capable of paying.56
Even though Medicaid eligibility requires proof of “financial need,”
nursing home care is so costly that “many middle-class elderly who
reside in nursing homes are driven into poverty,” thus rendering
them Medicaid-eligible.57
Individuals will qualify for Medicaid only if they meet the pro
gram’s “categorical and financial eligibility requirements.”58 The
categories of people who may qualify for Medicaid coverage in
clude individuals 65 or older, certain disabled individuals, parents
49. Id. at 117.
50. Id. at 123.
51. Id. at 123-24.
52. Id. at 124.
53. Medicare does cover some nursing home costs but provides limited reim
bursement and typically only reimburses care that qualifies as “skilled nursing” care. 42
C.F.R. §§ 409.31, .32 (2010). A lengthy discussion of Medicare coverage is outside the
scope of this Note; for more specific information on Medicare, see generally 42 U.S.C
§ 1395 (2006) (federal statute governing Medicare); FROLIK, supra note 1 (addressing
Medicare coverage in Chapter One).
54. STONE, supra note 23, at 1; see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128.
55. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128. Medicaid pays approximately 49% of all longterm care services. National Spending on Long-Term Care, supra note 47.
56. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128.
57. Id. at 129; see, e.g., supra note 40 (listing examples of cases in which the costs
of care depleted the ward’s assets).
58. STONE, supra note 23, at 4.
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and children, and pregnant women.59 However, coverage of nurs
ing home costs typically falls into the category of aged persons or
persons with disabilities.60
After individuals satisfy Medicaid’s categorical requirement,
they must also meet the financial requirement.61 This requirement,
commonly referred to as a standard or threshold, limits the amount
of income and assets an individual may possess before qualifying.62
These criteria are usually met in the following ways:
(1) [people] have income and assets equal to or below the statespecified thresholds; (2) [people] deplete their income and assets
on the cost of their care, thus “spending down”; or (3) [people]
divest of their assets to meet these income and asset standards
sooner than they otherwise might if they had to spend their in
come and assets on the cost of their care.63

Because the thresholds are set through a combination of federal
guidelines and state definitions, the specific income and asset re
strictions vary among states.64
The asset limitations usually require individuals to satisfy a re
source eligibility test. Following federal parameters, the states set
standards stipulating the uppermost amount of countable assets a
person may possess while still qualifying for Medicaid.65 Generally,
individuals satisfy the resource eligibility test if they have no more
than $2,000 in countable resources (e.g. “savings accounts, stocks,
or other equities”).66 The value of assets may be counted entirely,
59. Id.; see 42 U.S.C § 1396a (2006); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 130-33.
60. STONE, supra note 23, at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 7; see also id. at 37-45 (providing a Table with detailed information
about excludability of assets under SSI); Definition of a Resource for the SSI Program,
SOC. SECURITY ONLINE (Oct. 20, 2011, 9:12 AM), http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/an
swers/detail/a_id/412/kw/countable/session/L3RpbWUvMTI4Njg0NTY2MS9zaWQvZ
HZvVVJmY2s%3D (providing definition of a resource for the SSI program). See gen
erally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 132-33 (citing specific examples of non-countable as
sets); Countable Income for SSI Program, SOC. SECURITY ONLINE (last modified Oct.
13, 2011), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/countableincome.html (providing Social
Security’s definition of countable income).
66. STONE, supra note 23, at 7; see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 132-33 (listing
examples of non-countable assets which include: the principal residence, the value of
household goods, engagement rings, and a non-revocable burial contract).
It is also important to note that special rules apply to an individual’s primary place
of residence. Under federal law, the applicant’s equity interest in the home is exempt
and non-countable only up to $500,000 or $750,000 if the state elects to increase the
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excluded entirely, or excluded partially while counting the remain
ing portion.67 Individuals retaining countable resources in excess of
the maximum amount allowed by their state “must ‘spend down’
those resources by paying for the costs of their medical care, by
converting the resource into a non-countable resource, or by paying
support needs for themselves or their spouse.”68
II.

MEDICAID PLANNING AND GUARDIAN
INITIATED SPEND-DOWNS

A. Medicaid Planning in General
Medicaid planning is the process by which individuals protect
their assets by giving them to loved ones, or spending them, to cre
ate eligibility.69 Because nursing home care is so costly, individuals
could quickly deplete the resources they have built over a life
time.70 For example, if an individual sold his or her home to create
equity amount. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1)(B) (2006). Any equity in excess of the amount
chosen by the state is considered an available asset. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1)(A) (2006).
To qualify for Medicaid, people with home equity in excess of the threshold could use a
reverse mortgage or home equity loan to reduce their equity interest. STONE, supra
note 23, at 8. See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 101-05 (addressing specifically
nursing home private-pay methods that utilize home equity).
67. STONE, supra note 23, at 7.
68. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 133. Medicaid has special eligibility requirements for
married individuals that aim to protect the economic independence of the “community
spouse” (the spouse not living in a nursing home). For a more detailed discussion on
the protections provided to the “community spouse,” see id. at 135-42; see also STONE,
supra note 23, at 9-10 (discussing the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of
1998, which established new rules allowing the community spouse to retain higher
amounts of assets and income than the federal law allows); State Information, supra
note 41.
69. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142 (underscoring the need for proper planning by
noting that some spend-down attempts may render the individual ineligible for bene
fits); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c); STONE, supra note 23, at 2.
70. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773
So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the ward had about “$78,725 in
assets, a monthly income of $980.97, and a monthly deficit of $4,377.78” and “[h]er
guardians . . . alleged that [the ward] would deplete all of her assets to pay for her
nursing expenses in 10.64 months”); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731
32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that in December 2003 the ward had over $730,000 in assets with
a monthly income of about $5,700, but the costs of the ward’s care quickly depleted his
assets and he qualified for Medicaid in January 2006); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 911-12
(N.J. 2004) (noting that the ward’s “monthly nursing home expenses [were] $6,500”); In
re Labis, 714 A.2d 335, 336 (N.J. 1998) (noting that while the ward “was treated at the
Morris Hills Multicare Center” the cost of care was “$10,000 per month”); In re Shah,
694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that Shah’s hospital “care amounts to over
$1,000 per day” and a private pay rate “of $1,608.13 per day”); In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d
329, 330 (App. Div. 1996) (approving a proposed Medicaid spend-down which left the
ward “with approximately $150,000 in assets . . . together with [an] annual income [of]

262

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:251

a “pool of funds” to pay for nursing home care, the opportunity to
pass on the life savings or home to his or her heirs is lost.71 Some
critics may contend that this “is not a problem of affordable longterm care, but rather a failure or inability of the older person to
save enough to pay for life’s vicissitudes and still have an estate to
leave to the heirs.”72 Yet, Medicaid planning has quickly become a
subset of estate planning that allows individuals to legally divest
themselves of their wealth to qualify for Medicaid earlier than they
otherwise would if those assets were used to pay for their care.73
When individuals make gifts (one Medicaid planning technique),74 they may incur a period of Medicaid ineligibility known as
a “penalty period,”75 the length of which varies based on the
amount of assets “improperly transferred” divided by the average
monthly cost of nursing home care in the state.76 “Under [the] cur
rent law, the look-back date is five years prior to [the] application

(approximately $33,000)” which was enough to cover ward’s nursing home costs for
only 36 months).
71. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95.
72. Id.
73. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142. See generally Medi
caid Rules, supra note 23 (answering whether transferring assets is legal).
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006); see also STONE, supra note 23, at 10; FROLIK, supra
note 1, at 142-45; Donald D. Vanarelli, Financial Exploitation of the Elderly: Impact on
Medicaid Eligibility, 6 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’Y J. 39, 40 (2010).
76. The author uses the term “improperly transferred” to define those asset trans
fers incurring a penalty period, and one example of an improper transfer is a gift (an
asset transferred for less than fair market value). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A)
(2006) (stating that penalty periods are incurred for transferring assets for less than fair
market value, which is an improper transfer); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(E)(i) (2006) (defin
ing calculations for the penalty period); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.23; FROLIK, supra
note 1, at 142-43 (noting that “[t]he number of months [of the penalty period] is deter
mined by dividing the total . . . uncompensated value of all assets transferred (e.g. gifts),
on or after the look-back date by the average monthly cost . . . of a nursing facility in
the state . . . at the time of application”); see, e.g., Makepeace v. Dougherty, No. 10
10266-RWZ, 2010 WL 4180575, at *1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2010) (noting that Makepeace’s
Medicaid application was not approved because “he made a $11,005 disqualifying trans
fer of funds resulting in a 43-day penalty period of ineligibility”); V.S. v. Div. of Med.
Assistance & Health Serv., 2010 WL 1658592, at *3 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(imposing a 23 month and 14 day ineligibility period after the Medicaid applicant trans
ferred her home to her son); Talarico v. Dept. of Human Serv., 2009 WL 88118, at *1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (noting that Talarico made a $5,000 transfer from his
bank account to another’s and consequently incurred a one-month period of ineligibil
ity); Lancashire Hall Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 995 A.2d 540, 541
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (affirming the imposition of a 415 day penalty period of longterm care benefit ineligibility for transferring $98,763.85 for less than fair market value).
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[for] Medicaid,”77 and whether individuals incur a penalty depends
on whether they made a gift of an asset on or after the look-back
period.78 Currently, those applying for “Medicaid nursing home
benefits” care must disclose any gifts made within the five years
preceding the application.79
Once an individual incurs a penalty period, it begins to run on
the later of “the first day of the month during or after which the
assets [were gifted], or the date on which the individual is eligible
for Medicaid and would otherwise be receiving [nursing home
care].”80 Furthermore, subsequent gifts will extend the penalty pe
riod because the value of the gifts are combined and treated as if
the aggregate value were initially gifted.81
B. Medicaid Planning: Strategies and Important Considerations
Because individuals will likely incur a penalty period for gifts
transferred within the look-back period, it is important that they
consider a strategy for, and the consequences of, transferring assets
77. STONE, supra note 23, at 10; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006). Under the prior
law the look-back period was 36 months and 60 months for some trusts. STONE, supra
note 23, at 10 n.22; see, e.g., Zander v. Adams, 928 N.E.2d 492, 502-03 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (finding that because Zander applied for Medicaid only 37 months after transfer
ring assets from a trust, a period of ineligibility must be imposed because the transfer of
assets is subject to a 60 month look-back period); In re Sandra, 818 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440
(App. Div. 2006) (noting that the new Medicaid laws changed the look-back period
from 36 months to 60 months); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). But see V.S., 2010 WL 1658592, at
*3 n.1 (noting that while the DRA extended the look-back period, most counties still
apply the 36 month look-back period, and it is anticipated that all New Jersey counties
will begin applying the 60 month look-back period in 2011).
78. STONE, supra note 23, at 10. There are some exceptions to the general rule
that a gift triggers a penalty period. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (2006) (pro
viding that transfers of exempt assets do not trigger a penalty period); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(c)(2) (2006) (listing specific transfers that do not incur a penalty period such as:
transfers that would cause undue hardship; transfers that were intended to be disposed
of at fair market value; or transfers to trusts meeting statutory criteria); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(c)(2)(A) (2006) (listing specific situations in which transfer of a house does not
invoke a penalty period); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 146 (citing specific examples of ex
empt transfers such as: gifts to a spouse or disabled child; when denying eligibility
would cause undue hardship; or the transfer of the applicant’s home if it meets the
statutory conditions).
79. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B).
80. STONE, supra note 23, at 10. Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), the
period of ineligibility began to run during the month when the assets were transferred
or, if the state chose, in the month following the transfer. Id. at 10 n.24; see also 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (providing that ineligibility is determined by the
total cumulative value of uncompensated transfers); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.23;
FROLIK, supra note 1, at 144.
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for Medicaid eligibility.82 “[T]he goals are twofold: first, to pre
serve assets in order to supplement Medicaid and thereby maintain
the elder person’s quality of life until the very end, and, second, to
assure that the person’s life savings are passed on to loved ones
rather than consumed by long-term health care costs.”83 A com
mon Medicaid planning technique is to transfer a portion of a per
son’s assets, while retaining a portion that will satisfy the costs of
nursing home care during the penalty period incurred as a result of
the transfer.84 Individuals may also look to long-term care insur
ance to cover some of the costs incurred during the penalty pe
riod.85 If gifting the property, individuals must also consider
consequences that affect themselves or third parties. For example,
having a child hold assets in the Medicaid applicant’s name could
jeopardize the ability of the applicant’s grandchildren to qualify for
college financial aid.86 Furthermore, even in a stable family, some
family members may prove unwilling or unable to hold the gifted
funds for the applicant’s benefit.87
Another useful strategy for protecting savings is to convert
countable assets into non-countable assets.88 In this case, individu
als spend down assets used to determine eligibility on non-counta
ble assets, which, are not considered when determining Medicaid
82. See FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142-54; Joan M. Krauskopf et al., Elderlaw: Ad
vocacy for the Aging, 1 ELDERLAW ADVOC. AGING § 11:41 (Nov. 2009); Medicaid Plan
ning, ELDER L. ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/elder_info/elder_article.
asp?id=701 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Medicaid Planning] (outlining strat
egy and techniques for Medicaid planning and potential consequences). Because every
state has discretion in determining eligibility within the federal parameters, Medicaid
planning strategies differ in every state. See, e.g., Margaret H. Kreiner, Basic Medicaid
Strategies, OHIO ELDER L. § 8:10 (2009); Jennifer H. Leibson & Bernard M. Faller,
Medicaid Planning, 23 KY. PRAC. KY. ELDER L. § 9:12 (2010); Vincent J. Russo &
Marvin Rachlin, Medicaid Planning: Transfer of Assets, N.Y. ELDER L. PRAC. § 15:11
(May 2010) (discussing the role of attorneys and relevant strategies for Medicaid
planning).
83. John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 92 (2003).
84. Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41.
85. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, which discuss the cost-benefit
analysis an individual must make before purchasing long-term care insurance. See also
FROLIK, supra note 1, at 118 (noting that some individuals take out long-term care
insurance that pays benefits to cover any penalty period incurred due to disqualifying
gifts).
86. Medicaid Planning, supra note 82.
87. See generally id. (noting that once an applicant divests himself of the asset, he
loses ownership, and that asset is now owned by the donee who may lose it to bank
ruptcy, divorce, or lawsuit).
88. Id.
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eligibility.89 “For example, money in checking or savings accounts
may be used, without creating a period of ineligibility, to purchase
or improve a home, pay off a mortgage, buy a cemetery lot, [or]
pre-pay funeral services . . . .”90 These expenditures are examples
of non-countable assets that will not be considered part of an indi
vidual’s assets when determining his or her Medicaid eligibility.
The laws of Medicaid are complex, and the transfer of assets re
quires consideration of many factors, so it is recommended that in
dividuals consult with an attorney before executing any transfers in
pursuit of Medicaid eligibility.91
C. Reducing Medicaid Costs by Discouraging Medicaid Planning
More and more middle-class and wealthier individuals are us
ing Medicaid to pay for nursing home care,92 and “[a]s a result,
Medicaid expenditures [have] soared.”93 Recognizing the appeal of
transferring wealth to “create Medicaid eligibility,” Congress has
reacted by enacting several rules that make donors of these gifts
ineligible for Medicaid.94 The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of
2005 was Congress’s most recent attempt to curb Medicaid plan
ning; the Act made a number of changes to the rules concerning
asset transfers to ensure that Medicaid applicants apply their assets
89. Id.
90. Hal Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to do
Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 363 (1997); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210
(2010) (listing assets that are excluded when determining Medicaid eligibility).
91. Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41; Medicaid Planning, supra note 82.
92. SADLER, supra note 24, at 80.
93. Id.
94. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142. The DRA is not Congress’s first attempt to
discourage Medicaid planning. The court in Miller, when considering whether to ap
prove a Medicaid spend-down, gave great deference to a 1986 amendment to the fed
eral Medicaid laws that rendered certain trusts (previously considered a non-countable
asset) an available asset for determining Medicaid eligibility. The court noted that this
amendment was consistent with the Congressional intent that Medicaid is designed to
provide benefits to those who are truly needy. Miller v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab.
Serv., 64 P.3d 395, 401-02 (Kan. 2003).
Moreover, OBRA of 1993 was another attempt by Congress to “restrict access to
Medicaid’s long-term care services to those . . . who are poor or . . . have very high
medical or long-term care expenses” by establishing stricter asset transfer rules. STONE,
supra note 23, at 2. OBRA 1993 required the transfer of assets to occur 36 months
prior to applying for Medicaid and required the states to enact legislation concerning
estate recovery. Id. at 10 n.22; see also supra note 77 (noting that look-back period
under OBRA was 36 months). See generally SADLER, supra note 24, at 80-81 (provid
ing more detailed information about OBRA 1993).
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toward the cost of their care.95 First, the DRA lengthened the
look-back period for all income and asset transfers from 36 months
to 60 months.96 Additionally, the DRA changed the start date of
the penalty period to “[i]ncrease[ ] the probability that penalties ap
plied will actually be experienced by applicants,”97 and enabled
states to calculate the penalty period by treating the cumulative
value of assets transferred by an individual as one transfer.98 Over
all, these measures aim to impose stricter penalties on persons who
make multiple transfers; essentially, periods of ineligibility now run
consecutively rather than concurrently.99
Even though the DRA does not completely prohibit Medicaid
planning, it is clear that the legislative intent is to discourage indi
viduals from engaging in such planning as it diverts scarce resources
away from those who are truly in need to pay for care of people
who are less in need.100 Critics of Medicaid planning also argue
95. STONE, supra note 23, at 10, 29. See generally Summary of the New Medicaid
Rules (the DRA), ELDER L. ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/Elder_Info/
Elder_Article.asp?id=2751#9 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Transfer of Assets, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., (June 29, 2010, 6:41 A.M.), http://www.cms.gov/Medi
caidEligibility/10_TransferofAssets.asp#TopOfPage (providing basic information about
how the DRA affects Medicaid planning).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.22. See supra note 94
for more information on the prior look-back period, which discusses OBRA.
97. STONE, supra note 23, at 29.
98. Id. at 29-30; see also supra note 81 (for further information on accumulation
of assets transferred).
99. STONE, supra note 23, at 30; Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41 (noting
that the prior law did not trigger new penalty periods for subsequent transfers). The
DRA made other changes that significantly impacted the asset transfer and eligibility
rules. Addressing each of these changes is outside of the scope of this Note. See gener
ally FROLIK, supra note 1 (discussing further information on the treatment of: trusts;
annuities; notes and loans; home equity; life estates; continuing care retirement commu
nities; the income first rule for community spouses); STONE, supra note 23.
100. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see Striegel v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,
515 N.W.2d 245, 247-48 (S.D. 1994) (holding that “[t]he Medicaid program is not to be
used as an estate planning tool” and allowing “[the ward] to receive Medicaid benefits
while tens of thousands of dollars are sheltered in a trust violates the spirit and intent of
the Medicaid program and is unjust to those who do not have access to the supplemen
tal funds yet desperately need the benefits”); see also Zander v. Adams, 928 N.E.2d 492,
495-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Miller v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 64 P.3d 395,
401 (Kan.2003); Lebow v. Comm’r of Div. Med. Assistance, 740 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Mass.
2001); In re Rosckes, 783 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that Congres
sional intent indicates that Medicaid is intended to be the payor of last resort limited to
the financially needy, and individuals are expected to use their assets to pay for their
care rather than engaging in Medicaid planning). See generally Karla Levinson, Com
ment, Long-Term Care Alert: An Analysis of Delaware’s Approach to Medicaid Plan
ning Techniques and Why Curbing Medicaid Planning Will Not Solve the Nation’s
Long-Term Care Problem, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 223 (2007); Bryn A. Poland, Comment,
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that it shifts the financial burden from those individuals capable of
paying for their care to the Medicaid program. Essentially, “people
should assume financial responsibility . . . before relying on tax dol
lars to pay for care they could otherwise afford.”101 Congress de
termined that “cutting benefit packages, eligibility, or
reimbursement[s] . . . to providers” were not desirable outcomes.102
Instead, discouraging Medicaid planning and restricting eligibility
to those who are truly needy better accomplishes Congress’s goal of
preserving Medicaid benefits for the neediest persons.103
By contrast, others contend that Medicaid planning is an essen
tial tool for individuals who wish to protect their assets.104 The pro
ponents note that although the DRA discourages Medicaid
planning, it does not completely prohibit individuals from engaging
in such planning.105 They further argue that individuals should
have the absolute power to do whatever they want with their assets,
and this includes giving them away.106 In fact, the government has
no right to complain when middle class individuals, faced with des
perate circumstances, intentionally impoverish themselves because
the government “established the rule that poverty is a prerequisite
to [receiving] government assistance [to] defray[ ] . . . the costs of
ruinously expensive, but absolutely essential, medical treat
ment.”107 “Few would suggest that it is improper for taxpayers to
maximize their deductions under our tax laws to preserve income
for themselves and their families—even though they are . . . reduc
Don’t Plan on Aging: The Kansas Supreme Court Reaffirms its Hostility Toward Medi
caid Planning, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (2006) (evaluating Delaware’s and Kansas’s ap
proaches, respectively, aiming to curb Medicaid planning).
101. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see also supra note 100 (noting that this concept
is consistent with Medicaid being the payor of last resort).
102. STONE, supra note 23, at 22.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also H.K. v. State, 877 A.2d 1218 (N.J. 2005); In re Keri, 853 A.2d
909 (N.J. 2004); In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2000) (determining that
Medicaid planning is permissible under the current Medicaid laws and reasonable indi
viduals aim to preserve assets for themselves and their families); In re Daniels, 618
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
105. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (noting that “Medicaid planning is legally permissi
ble”); see In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1996). Although this case was de
cided before the DRA was enacted, the court’s point is still applicable today. The court
noted that “Medicaid . . . was not designed to provide medical benefits to those who
[purposely] render themselves ‘needy’,” but “the simple fact is that the current law
rewards prudent ‘Medicaid planning.’” Id. at 331-32; see also supra note 82 (providing
strategies for Medicaid planning post-DRA).
106. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing the lower court’s opinion in In re Shah, 694
N.Y.S.2d 82, 86-87 (App. Div. 1999)).
107. Id.
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ing . . . money available to [the] government for its public pur
poses.”108 Similarly, Medicaid planning allows individuals to
protect their assets from depletion and then distribute them in ac
cordance with their wishes.109
Typically, individuals “feel they should be able to leave their
estates to their loved ones.”110 Supporters of Medicaid planning
also argue that the low asset thresholds require people to become
penniless before they can qualify for assistance, thus leaving them
without the resources they need.111 The final argument in support
of Medicaid planning is that the cuts to Medicaid under the DRA
were misguided, as “planning was not a large contributor toward
Medicaid’s financial strain.”112 Though the critics of Medicaid plan
ning argue that spend-downs should be discouraged, the fact re
mains that Medicaid planning is not entirely foreclosed to
individuals wishing to engage in it.
D. Guardians and Medicaid Planning
While Medicaid planning itself is a controversial subject, Medi
caid planning initiated and executed by guardians on behalf of their
wards who require nursing home care is even more contested. The
law presumes that adults possess mental capacity, which is defined
as being “capable of making rational decisions and [being] best situ
ated [to do so on one’s] own behalf.113 An individual’s autonomy
and independence are founded on the absolute right to make
108. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (contending that Medicaid planning is the analog to
estate planning, which is common and acceptable); In In re Trott, the court held that
courts may authorize the transfer of a ward’s property to minimize estate taxes and fees
in accord with the following courts:
Accord: In re DuPont, . . . 194 A.2d 309 (Ch.1963); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156
(N.H.Sup.Ct.1971); In re Carson, . . . 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup.Ct.1962); In re
Groff Estate, 38 Pa.Dist.C.R.2d 556 (1965). Cf. In re Johnson, . . . 162 A.96
(Ch.1932); In re Brice’s Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576
(Sup.Ct.1943); In re Buckley’s Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33
(Sup.Ct.1951); In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547
(Sup.Ct.1964). Contra: In re Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.Civ.App.1966).
In re Trott, 288 A.2d 303, 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); see also Fliegelman &
Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 368 (noting that Medicaid planning should be allowed like
other tax and estate planning).
109. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920.
110. STONE, supra note 23, at 3.
111. Id. But see FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95 (noting that this is not a problem
concerning health care costs or Medicaid eligibility but is really a failure of individuals
to save enough money to pay for their care).
112. STONE, supra note 23, at 22.
113. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 155.
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choices regarding “his or her property or person.”114 For those who
are incapacitated,115 a guardian may be appointed as a “substitute
decision maker”;116 legally, the decisions of the guardian are
treated as if they were made by the ward.117 Without a guardian,
the incapacitated persons would reside in a “legal limbo” because
they are unable to make decisions for themselves.118 Appointment
of a guardian ensures that the incapacitated person is fully able to
participate in life.119
When appointing a guardian, professional guardians are distin
guished from nonprofessional guardians. Generally, the former is
required to meet age, experience, education, and character require
ments,120 while the latter is a friend or family member of the
114. Id.
115. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-102(4) (2006) defines “[i]ncapacitated person” as
“an individual who, for reasons other than being a minor, . . . lacks the ability to meet
essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate
technological assistance.” Discussing the various standards for determining incapacity
is beyond the scope of this Note. See also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 160-63 (discussing
more specifically the various definitions and approaches for determining whether an
individual is incapacitated).
116. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156. Each state has its own laws that provide proce
dures empowering the courts to appoint guardians. Id.; see also Fliegelman &
Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 343 (explaining that each state’s “definitions, procedures,
and requirements” vary a great deal, but that each “state requires some [form] of peti
tion, notice, and judicial consideration”). See generally 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian &
Ward §§ 1-220 (2008) (discussing guardian ward jurisprudence).
117. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156; see Romo v. Kirschner, 889 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the trust created by a conservator on behalf of the ward
was “[i]n reality . . . created by [the ward]”); Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d 379, 382-84
(Conn. 1993) (holding that the Medicaid qualifying trust established by the ward’s con
servator was in fact established by the ward as the ward provided all of the considera
tion); Williams v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 899 P.2d 452, 456 (Kan. 1995)
(holding that for purposes of determining whether a trust is a Medicaid qualifying trust,
“implicit in the term ‘individual’ is a person acting as an individual’s legal representa
tive where the individual is incapable of acting on his or her own”).
“Guardianship is the legal process of providing a substitute decision maker for a
mentally incapacitated individual.” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 159. This Note aims only
to provide a general understanding of the guardian-ward relationship, and specific dis
cussion of guardianship is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally id. at 155-213;
Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90 (providing an in depth discussion on the his
tory of guardianships, guardian duties and powers, and the implications of guardian
appointment for a ward).
118. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156.
119. Id.
120. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.26.020 (2010) (requiring a minimum age, casework
experience, education standard, certification, and criminal background checks); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 697 (West 2010) (requiring a statement providing educational
background, professional experience, references, information regarding value of assets
managed, and past resignations).
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ward.121 To alleviate the knowledge and experience disparity be
tween professional and nonprofessional guardians, a nonprofes
sional guardian may be required to take an educational course
discussing the powers and duties of the position.122 Although a pro
fessional guardian, due to greater education and experience, is
likely more familiar with guardian powers and duties, courts usually
express a tendency to appoint nonprofessional guardians.123 Once
a guardian is appointed he or she is charged with making the best
decisions on behalf of the ward.124
Whether a guardian may engage in Medicaid planning on be
half of the ward depends upon the state law.125 Currently, every
state has a statute that contemplates guardian capabilities for en
gaging in estate planning and gifting.126 Whether the guardian may
actually engage in this planning depends on how the court exercises
its discretion and interprets the statute, and whether the court au
thorizes the guardian’s proposed spend-down.127 Several states list
121. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.008 (West 2011) (defining professional
guardian as someone “who is not a member of the incapacitated person’s family and
who charges fees for carrying out [their] duties” (emphasis added)). The negative im
plication of this definition is that nonprofessional guardians include family members
who do not charge fees and do not meet professional licensing requirements. See supra
note 120.
122. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1457 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 744.3145(c)(4) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-10 (LexisNexis 2010).
123. In re Joshua H., 880 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that “[t]he
appointment of a family member is preferable, but if a suitable family member is not
available, it is within the court’s discretion to appoint an outsider”) (ciations omitted);
In re Hancock, 828 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that relatives are
preferred appointees, but that the court reserves discretion to appoint a professional
fiduciary).
124. See supra note 117 (noting that the powers of each guardianship and
whether the guardian’s acts are permissible vary with the type of guardianship and the
applicable state laws).
125. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 167.
126. See infra Appendix (providing the statutes and principal cases for each
state); see, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 119-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004); In re John XX, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329,
332 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that incapacitated persons have the same rights as those
who are competent to engage in Medicaid planning through their guardian). But see In
re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 732 (N.H. 2008) (finding that the trial court
erred in “ruling that the [guardians] had a fiduciary duty to impoverish the ward in
order to qualify him for Medicaid so that his assets could be protected for his spouse”).
See generally Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90.
127. See, e.g., Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1098-99; John, 652
N.Y.S.2d 329, 331-332 (holding specifically that guardians may engage in Medicaid
spend downs); see also In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 522-23
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that the courts may authorize guardians to make gifts for estate planning).

2012]

MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS

271

factors to be considered within the statutes,128 while other states
have incorporated a range of factors through their common law.129
Some of the more common factors the courts consider before ap
proving a spend-down include: the permanency of the ward’s condi
tion; whether the remaining assets will meet the needs of the ward
and his dependents (if any); whether a reasonable person under the
circumstances would have made the transfer;130 who is receiving the
property; whether the transfer will benefit the estate; the size of the
estate; and past gifts, donative intent, or prior estate planning.131
Once a state allows Medicaid planning by guardians, each state adopts a doctrine that
determines the permissibility of such planning. See Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra
note 90, at 349-53 (enumerating and explaining guardianship standards: continuing pat
tern, best interests, and substituted judgment).
128. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2580-86 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26
a (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50, -58 (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.21 (McKinney 2006). See generally infra Appendix.
129. See In re Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So.2d 550, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (incorporating several factors enumerated in Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523
25); Keri, 853 A.2d at 913 (adopting the factors enumerated in Trott); see also Christian
sen, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523-25 (providing factors the court must consider before allowing a
guardian to divest a ward of his assets, which were later codified in California Probate
Code 2580-86).
130. The doctrine of substituted judgment provides courts with the authority to
permit a guardian’s transfer of the ward’s property so long as the transfer would have
been made by either: the ward, if competent, or a reasonably prudent person in the
ward’s position.
Christiansen v. Christiansen (In re Guardianship of Christiansen), 56 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 524 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating that the court must determine whether
the incompetent as a reasonably prudent person would make proposed gifts);
Strange v. Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Mass. 1970) (stating that courts
have power to authorize transfers of incompetent’s property where it appears
that incompetent, if sane, would have made the transfers as a reasonably pru
dent person); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156, 158 (N.H. 1971) (stating that guard
ian is authorized to act as a reasonable and prudent person would act under
same circumstances); In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (find
ing that a competent, reasonable person in the position of the incompetent
individual would be likely to make same renunciation of inheritance proposed
by guardian); In re Parnes, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 7, 1995, at 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7,
1995) (stating that court must determine whether ward would have transferred
own assets if ward had capacity to act); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504
(Sup. Ct. 1994) ([I]t is the Court’s conclusion that a competent, reasonable
individual in the position of the [disabled individual] would be likely to make
the proposed transfer . . . .”); In re Florence, 530 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (Sur. Ct.
1988) (stating that guardian or court has the power to gift ward’s property
provided that the ward “would be likely to make such a transfer, if capable of
doing so”).
Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 370 & n.183.
131. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2580-86 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.441 (West
2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50 to -58
(West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (McKinney 2006). The author wishes to
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Because courts must examine various factors before authoriz
ing guardian-initiated transfers, each proposed spend-down is de
cided on a case-by-case basis.132 Although the states consider many
of the same factors when making their decisions, the outcomes vary
greatly. For example, both New Jersey and New York have
adopted presumptions in favor of allowing guardian-initiated Medi
caid planning.133 The primary argument for allowing a guardian to
engage in Medicaid planning rests on the premise that guardians
typically may engage in other estate planning on behalf of their
wards.134 In line with this contention, the court in In re Keri noted
that it is not “improper for taxpayers to maximize their deductions
under our tax laws to preserve income for themselves and their
families.”135 Similarly, the court in In re Shah noted that “any per
son . . . would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State,
as opposed to his family.”136 These courts recognize that individu
als prefer their assets be left to loved ones, rather than spending the
assets on the costs of nursing home care. However, the more per
suasive argument rests on the policies of fairness and equal protec
tion.137 Specifically, the court in Keri held that “[s]o long as the law
note that the factors provided are illustrative and not exhaustive. See generally infra
Appendix (providing each state’s statute and cases enumerating the factors that need to
be considered).
132. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990); C. Edward Galfand, Heeding the Call for a Predictable Rule of Origin, 11 U. PA.
J. INT’L BUS. L. 469, 488-89 (1989) (discussing the benefits and costs of case-by-case
analysis, specifically noting the efficiency and clarity of bright-line rules as compared to
decreased predictability, but increased flexibility of case-by-case analysis).
133. Supra note 17 and accompanying text; accord Keri, 853 A.2d at 916-17
(quoting Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1099) (declining to impose a duty, but establishing a pre
sumption in favor of spend-downs on “ground[s] that a reasonable and competent per
son ‘would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as opposed to his
family’”).
134. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 522-23 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967); In re Bohac, 380 So.2d 550, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Strange v.
Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 709-10 (Mass. 1970); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156, 158 (N.H.
1971) (holding that a guardian may engage in prudent estate planning on behalf of his
ward); see also Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (N.J. 2004) (noting specifically that individuals
engage in tax planning to minimize their tax consequence thereby preserving their as
sets); Jason A. Frank, The Necessity of Medicaid Planning, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 29, 38-39
(1999) (comparing Medicaid planning to tax planning); Matthew Wilson, The Future of
Medicaid Planning in Missouri, 62 J. MO. B. 62, 70 (2006) (comparing Medicaid plan
ning to tax planning).
135. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920.
136. Shah, 733 N.E. 2d at 1099 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Shah 694
N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (App. Div. 1999)).
137. Strange, 260 N.E.2d at 709-10; Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; In re Daniels, 618
N.Y.S.2d 499, 502 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that denying guardians the ability to transfer
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allows competent persons to engage in Medicaid planning, incom
petent persons, through their guardians, should have the same
right.”138
On the other hand, several states tend to examine the factors in
a manner that leans against Medicaid planning by guardians.139
The most persuasive argument for limiting guardian-initiated Medi
caid planning is that the guardian has a duty to protect and preserve
the ward’s estate in order to use those assets for the ward’s care.140
In Domey, the court disagreed with the ward’s spouse, who argued
that the ward’s guardians had a duty to engage in Medicaid plan
ning so the ward’s assets could be used for her support.141 The
court held that “[t]he primary duty of the guardian is to protect the
estate’s assets [and] to apply them for the support and care of the
ward.”142 The court reached this decision by narrowly interpreting
the guardianship statute and concluding that “its primary objective
is to protect the well-being of the ward.”143
Similarly, in In re Adler, the court held that the guardian’s pro
posed Medicaid plan, which did not benefit the ward, contravened
the guardian’s duty to protect and preserve the ward’s assets for her
own enjoyment.144 This contention is in line with the policy that
Medicaid be the payor of last resort, and individuals who can fi
nance their own care should not shelter their assets merely to qual
ify for Medicaid sooner than they otherwise would.145
Consequently, these states are more hesitant to allow guardian-ini
tiated Medicaid planning.
In fact, California courts have held, pursuant to the California
Probate Code, “that [a] conservator is not required to propose any
action under [S]ection 2580” such as making gifts or engaging in
a ward’s assets is denying the ward an opportunity available to all competent persons);
see also supra note 126 (citing other cases holding that individuals with guardians
should be afforded the same ability to engage in planning as competent individuals).
138. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920.
139. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733 (N.H. 2008); In re
Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2003) (holding that the
guardian has a duty to protect the ward’s assets and apply them to the ward’s care).
140. Supra note 139 (noting that the guardian has a duty to apply the ward’s
assets for the ward’s care).
141. Domey, 960 A.2d at 732.
142. Id. at 733.
143. Id.; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (2004).
144. Adler, 2003 WL 22053309, at *6.
145. See supra note 100; supra Part II.C (discussing policies for the DRA).
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planning that would benefit the estate.146 Rather than require the
conservator to initiate such action on behalf of the ward, the court
held that the remedy is for an “interested person”147 “to petition
[the court] under Section 2580 for an order requiring the conserva
tor to take such action with respect to estate planning or making
gifts.”148
New Hampshire, like California, also takes a more restrictive
approach when determining guardian duties for Medicaid planning.
Pursuant to Domey, a guardian has a duty only “when there is a
showing of need and . . . ‘more than sufficient’ resources to provide
for the [ward].”149 With the costs of nursing home care averaging
about $77,000 a year, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
wards will have “more than sufficient resources” to pay for their
care so that guardians would have a duty to spend down.150 In fact,
Donald Domey’s $353,177 of liquid assets was nearly depleted
within two years due to the costs of his care.151 The depletion of
assets is not a failure of the older person to save enough to cover
long-term care costs and still have assets to leave to heirs.152
Rather, this is the result of guardians not being held to a high
enough standard to provide adequate protection to a particularly
vulnerable group of people. The approaches of California and New
Hampshire are lacking because they fail to impose a duty on the
guardian to initiate a spend-down.

146. Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 2580-85 (West 2002).
147. CAL. PROB. CODE § 48 (West 2002) (defining interested person); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2616 (West 2002) (expanding interested person to “including persons having
only an expectancy or prospective interest in the estate”).
148. Johnson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 (quoting 20 CAL. L. REV. COMM. REPORTS
1001 (1990)).
149. In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733 (N.H. 2008).
150. Id.; see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (illustrating the high
costs of nursing home care and its effect on a ward’s assets).
151. Domey, 960 A.2d at 731-32.
152. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95 (stating specifically that the problem is not the
cost of health care, but rather a failure of the elderly to save enough money to cover the
costs).
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TO A

A. States Should Impose a Duty on Guardians to Petition Courts
for a Spend-Down
To guarantee that wards are receiving adequate protection
from the needless expenditure of assets, guardians should have a
duty to petition the court for approval of a Medicaid spend-down
where the ward requires nursing home care indefinitely. The Illi
nois approach, where guardians owe a fiduciary duty to their wards,
should be followed.153 There, the guardian “is held to the highest
standard of fair dealing and diligence, and his [or her] behavior will
be closely scrutinized by the courts to insure his adherence to these
high standards.”154 In In re Connor, the court held that a guardian
violated his duty to the ward by failing to engage in Medicaid plan
ning. In this case, the ward had sufficient assets to pay nursing
home bills for about five years.155 Thereafter, the guardian could
have placed the ward’s remaining assets into a prepaid burial plan
thus rendering her Medicaid eligible.156 If the guardian had
“[sought] public aid . . . in a diligent and orderly manner,” there
would have been no need to liquidate the ward’s assets to pay for
her care. Ultimately, the guardian’s failure “resulted in [an] unnec
essary dissipation of estate assets.”157 Consequently, a heightened
standard of care for guardians is necessary to prevent the needless
expenditure of the ward’s assets.

153. In re Estate of Wellman, 673 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 1996); In re Guardianship
of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. App. 1988); In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690,
697 (Ill. App. 1987).
154. Berger, 520 N.E.2d at 697; see also Wellman, 673 N.E.2d at 278 (analogizing
the guardian relationship to “the relation of trustee and beneficiary between the guard
ian and the ward”). If this analogy is accurate, then the guardian is bound to follow the
statutory scheme and fiduciary standards much like the trustee is bound to follow the
powers and duties outlined in the statutes and trust instrument. See generally Marshall
v. First Nat. Bank Alaska, 97 P.3d 830, 839 (Alaska. 2004) (holding that “[a] trustee is a
fiduciary of the highest order and is held to a high standard of conduct”); 76 AM. JUR.
2D Trusts § 349 (2010) (providing a more detailed description of trustee duties and
describing a trustee as a fiduciary held to a high standard of conduct and loyalty).
155. Connor, 525 N.E.2d at 214-16.
156. Id. at 217; see also supra note 66 (providing examples of other non-countable
assets).
157. Connor, 525 N.E.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
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B. Imposing a Duty: Promoting Fairness and Equality
The disadvantages faced by wards (because disposition of
property must be court authorized) raise serious equal protection158
and fairness concerns. Imposing a duty accomplishes the dual pur
pose of allowing wards to dispose of their property, while alleviat
ing these serious concerns.159
Usually, individuals can do whatever they wish with their prop
erty,160 and people work their entire lives expecting to leave their
assets to their families.161 However, wards are unable to make im
portant decisions for themselves or divest assets on their own,162
and the courts recognize that a guardian’s failure to act leaves the
ward in “legal limbo.”163 Meanwhile, competent individuals have
the luxury of engaging in Medicaid planning at any time because
their actions do not require court supervision.164 Without guardians
proposing a spend-down, wards cannot dispose of their property
and, as a result, are left significantly disadvantaged compared to
their competent counterparts. Essentially, wards are unable to
avail themselves of the potential benefits of Medicaid planning, yet
competent individuals may do so without any judicial supervision.
Although Medicaid planning may be frowned upon by Con
gress, “the government itself . . . has established the rule that pov
erty is a prerequisite to the receipt of [Medicaid].”165 Wards should
not be left to shoulder all of their nursing home costs merely be
cause Congress, and many courts, frown upon Medicaid plan
158. Supra notes 126, 127, 137, 138 and accompanying text.
159. Supra notes 117-119 (noting that guardians are appointed to protect the in
capacitated person who is unable to make decisions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1)(c)
(2006); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that individuals in nursing homes require
skilled nursing care because of their mental and physical condition).
160. See, e.g., supra note 106 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that Congress recognizes
the instinct to engage in Medicaid planning in order to pass assets on to family mem
bers); see also In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004); In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093,
1099 (N.Y. 2000); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that
people would rather leave assets to their loved ones than spend those assets on the costs
of their care).
162. See infra Appendix (providing statutes outlining procedures by which a
guardian may divest a ward of his assets with court approval); see FROLIK, supra note 1,
at 156 (stating that without a guardian wards would be left in “legal limbo”).
163. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156
164. See supra note 137.
165. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1101 (quoting In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div.
1999)); see also Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (noting specifically that it is not “improper for
taxpayers to maximize their deductions under our tax laws to preserve income for
themselves and their families”).
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ning.166 The fact remains that Medicaid planning is not entirely
prohibited, and competent individuals may engage in such planning
without any court approval.167 States participating in the Medicaid
program are required to comply with the federal statute.168 Gener
ally, a state cannot impose more restrictions than the federal law
requires.169 Because Medicaid spend-downs are not prohibited by
federal law, state law cannot prohibit them either. For example, a
Connecticut statute states explicitly that a guardian may not impov
erish his ward for the purpose of qualifying for federal benefits.170
Despite this clear language, the Connecticut courts have held that
the statute is inapplicable to Medicaid, based on the foregoing rea
sons.171 The states may not prohibit these petitions where the fed
eral government has not proscribed spend-downs.
Because the cost of nursing home care can quickly deplete a
ward’s assets,172 and the goal of a guardianship is to ensure that the
ward “is able to fully participate in life,”173 guardians should have a
duty to explore available remedies that alleviate costs and protect
assets; this is especially true in light of the fact that Congress and
the courts recognize people’s preference to leave assets to their
166. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing several cases that
note Medicaid is to be the payor of last resort and is reserved for the truly needy).
167. H.K. v. State, 877 A.2d 1218, 1226 (N.J. 2005); Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; Shah,
733 N.E.2d at 1098; Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02 (determining that Medicaid plan
ning is permissible under the current Medicaid laws and it is reasonable for individuals
to aim to preserve assets for themselves and their families); see also infra Appendix
(providing statutes for every state which contemplates estate planning by guardians on
behalf of wards).
168. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
169. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396; FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75-76 (providing
information about the joint federal-state laws); MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE, supra note
23.
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-655 (West Supp. 2011).
171. State v. Henneberry, No. CV020098667S, 2003 WL 23149933, at *2-3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2003) (holding that despite Connecticut’s strong public policy
against spend-downs as a means of qualifying for state or federal aid, “[t]he only excep
tion to such proscription pertains to” Medicaid and “[t]his exception . . . is in accord
with . . . federal law”).
172. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216-17 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (holding that the guardian breached the fiduciary duty owed to the ward by fail
ing to invest the ward’s assets in a manner so as to qualify her for public aid thereby
causing “unnecessary dissipation of estate assets”); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960
A.2d 729, 732 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the ward’s assets were nearly depleted after two
years of care); see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that the cost of care will
greatly deplete an individual’s assets); METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra
note 31, at 14-19 (stating that the average cost of nursing home care is $198 per day).
173. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156.
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heirs.174 Requiring guardians to petition the court for a spenddown alleviates the equal protection and fairness concerns by al
lowing the wards to avail themselves of planning techniques availa
ble to competent individuals.175
C. Imposing a Duty: Practical and Effective
There are several reasons why imposing a duty is the most
practical and least invasive solution that would effectively provide
adequate protection for wards. First, this duty applies in very nar
row circumstances to meet the needs of a vulnerable population.
Requiring guardians to petition the courts ensures that they will ex
plore all available options and take appropriate action. Such a duty
will prevent the guardian from taking less action than necessary,176
and will avoid shifting the burden of caring for the ward to “inter
ested persons” who would have to petition the courts to take action
where the guardian fails to do so.177 After all, a guardian is ap
pointed to ensure that the ward is not left in “legal limbo”;178 there
fore, the guardian should have the burden and duty of protecting
the ward, which encompasses proposing a Medicaid spend-down.
Instituting this heightened standard of care is administratively
feasible and efficient. This specific change in the standard of care,
in fact, can be accomplished with little or no change to each state’s
guardian laws. Currently, each state’s statutes and common law al
ready contemplate estate planning and gifting by guardians.179 The
states need only change the duty of the guardian to petition the
courts, in this specific instance, from permissive to mandatory. This
change could be effectuated through a common law interpretation
of the duty or a change in the statutory language. Moreover, each
guardian may be informed of this duty by the court upon appoint
ment.180 In either situation, this change would be highly effective
174. Supra note 161 (noting that Congress and the courts recognize the instinct to
leave assets to heirs rather than use those assets to cover costs of care).
175. See supra notes 126-127; infra Appendix.
176. See, e.g., Connor, 525 N.E.2d at 216-17 (requiring the guardian to reimburse
the ward’s estate for costs that could have been avoided if the guardian had engaged in
Medicaid planning).
177. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2585 (2002); Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding “that the conservator is not required to propose any ac
tion under section 2580” and requiring interested persons to institute the action where
the guardian does not).
178. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156.
179. Infra Appendix.
180. One way to ensure that guardians are informed is by requiring them to at
tend an educational course. See supra note 122.
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and minimally invasive, as it would affect a narrow population and
requires only a minor change in the guardianship laws.
Additionally, this change strikes a balance between a brightline rule (imposing a duty on guardians to petition the courts under
these circumstances) and flexibility (preserving case-by-case analy
sis and approval based on the court’s discretion). If guardians are
required to submit a petition, then the court can determine, based
on its existing presumptions and statutory and common law factors,
whether the spend-down is appropriate.181 This minimal change
not only enables the courts to work within the standards of review
based on their current state law, but also ensures greater compli
ance with the law by placing the inquiry with the entity most suita
ble to properly evaluate a spend-down proposal—the court.
Because this planning typically requires court approval, guardi
ans alone should not determine whether the planning is appropriate
or not. Rather, the independent judgment should be taken from
the hands of guardians, who have varying degrees of experience
and knowledge, and placed with the more apt courts. First, courts
tend to favor appointing nonprofessional guardians, which means
more guardians less familiar with complex guardian and Medicaid
rules.182 Meanwhile, the lesser-appointed professional guardians,
subject to rigorous licensing requirements, are more likely to be fa
miliar with court procedure, Medicaid requirements, and various
planning tools that help wards maintain their wealth.183 Even the
rudimentary crash course given to newly appointed guardians can
not dispense with this knowledge disparity;184 at best, it scratches
the surface of the complexities of the guardian-ward relationship
and potential dispositions of property the guardian is authorized to
make. A mandatory spend-down ensures that a guardian, who may
be less experienced, will not overlook useful planning techniques
that prevent unnecessary exhaustion of the ward’s assets.
181. Infra Appendix (providing the statutes for each state).
182. See supra note 123.
183. See, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.26.020 (requiring a minimum age, casework
experience, education standard, certification, and criminal background checks); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 697 (requiring a statement providing educational background, pro
fessional experience, references, information regarding value of assets managed, and
past resignations).
184. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3145(2) (requiring “a minimum of 8 hours
of . . . training” (emphasis added)), with ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.26.020(a)(2) (requir
ing at least “two or more years” of experience “or at least an associate degree” in
certain fields (emphasis added)).
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Even though this increases litigation for a busy court, the court
must already approve dispositions of the ward’s property.185 In
fact, the court is most familiar with guardian laws, Medicaid spenddowns, and determining whether a spend-down is in the best inter
ests of the ward. Furthermore, it is the court’s duty to ensure the
safety and well being of the ward by managing and protecting the
ward’s estate, so the guardian acts merely as the hand of the
court.186 Given the complexity of the Medicaid and guardianship
laws187 this is a matter appropriately left in the court’s discretion.
The cost of busy courts is balanced by the proportionately worth
while benefit of providing necessary judicial oversight to a particu
larly vulnerable population and the ruinous long-term care costs to
which they are subjected. Therefore, the mandatory petition pro
tects the wards by ensuring that guardians do not dispose of a po
tential spend-down by failing to submit petitions on their wards’
behalves.
D. Imposing a Duty will not be the Straw that Breaks the
Medicaid Camel’s Back
1. Additional Costs for Medicaid
One criticism of a heightened duty deals with the concerns that
more planning may require Medicaid to shoulder the costs for some
individuals sooner than it otherwise might have. Congress has re
185. Infra Appendix (noting specifically that the statutes require court approval
prior to planning).
186. In re Estate of Wellman, 673 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 1996) (noting that “[t]he
guardian only acts as the hand of the court and is at all times subject to the court’s
direction in the manner in which the guardian provides for the care and support of the
disabled person”) (citing In re Estate of Nelson, 621 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993));
In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). In Berger, the court
defined its power as “function[ing] in a central role which permits it to oversee and
control all aspects of the management and protection of the incompetent’s estate. The
court controls the person and estate of the ward, and directs the conservator’s care,
management and investment of the estate.” Id. at 696-97; accord Probate of Marcus,
509 A.2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1986) (holding that “[t]he court, and not the conservator” is prima
rily in charge of caring for the ward’s estate and “the conservator is but the agent of the
court” acting under its supervision (citing Shippee v. Commercial Trust Co., 161 A.2d
775, 777 (Conn. 1932))); AmSouth Bank v. Cunningham, 253 S.W.3d 636, 641-42 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that conservators act as agents of the court and “that ‘the court
itself is ultimately responsible for the disabled persons who come under its care and
protection’” (quoting In re Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. (1995))).
187. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (providing some of the fac
tors considered before approving a Medicaid spend-down); supra Part II.B. (noting the
complexity of Medicaid as it applies to planning techniques); infra Appendix (providing
the statutes for each state).
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acted to increased Medicaid costs by passing OBRA, and later, the
DRA.188 Still, Medicaid covers approximately 49% of all long-term
care costs.189 For these reasons, critics of the proposed change may
argue that a heightened duty imposed upon guardians would have a
devastating effect on Medicaid.190 This calamity, however, will not
necessarily transpire. First, the duty applies to a narrow population
comprised only of people who have guardians and are facing an
indefinite term of nursing home care. Because the costs of nursing
home care are so high, and this population will remain in nursing
home care longer, it is probable that the estates of these individuals
would be depleted fairly quickly, thus leaving Medicaid to cover the
costs of their care anyway.191
Second, while many courts view Medicaid as the payor of last
resort,192 the modern view of Medicaid has changed and Medicaid
benefits are not necessarily reserved for the truly needy; rather,
more middle class individuals rely upon Medicaid for long-term
care benefits.193 In fact, Medicaid pays for most long-term care
costs, and most nursing home facilities would go bankrupt if they
did not receive Medicaid reimbursement for services.194
Despite clear disapproval of Medicaid spend-downs, Congress
has not completely closed the door to such planning. Congress pre
viously attempted to prohibit such planning with the “Granny Goes
188. Supra Part II.C.
189. National Spending on Long-Term Care, supra note 47.
190. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d. 379, 385 (Conn. 1993) (“The medicaid
program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were permitted to preserve assets for their
heirs while receiving medicaid benefits from the state.”).
191. See, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (calculating the ward’s assets, monthly income, and nursing home costs
and determining the ward had “a monthly deficit of $4,377.78”); In re Guardianship of
Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731-32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the ward’s assets were suffi
ciently depleted to qualify him for Medicaid after two years nursing home care); In re
Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 912 (N.J. 2004) (allowing the ward to engage in a Medicaid spenddown and noting that “$78,000 would be sufficient to pay [her] nursing home [care]” for
her 16 month penalty period); see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that the cost
of care will greatly deplete an individual’s assets); METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTI
TUTE, supra note 31, at 14-19 (stating that the average cost of nursing home care is $198
per day).
192. Supra note 100.
193. SADLER, supra note 24, at 80 (noting that more and more middle class indi
viduals are using Medicaid to cover nursing home costs).
194. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that residents have over half their care
paid for by Medicaid); see STONE, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that Medicaid is the larg
est provider funding nursing home care). But see supra note 100 (providing sources
agreeing with Congress that Medicaid is to be the payor of last resort reserved for the
truly needy).
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to Jail” Act.195 There, “Congress was so incensed by the practice of
voluntary impoverishment to obtain Medicaid that it made it a
crime both for citizens to practice it and for lawyers to advise their
clients how to do so.”196 Congress later amended the statute, re
pealing the portions targeting the elderly and replacing it with lan
guage that criminalized the acts of attorneys who assisted clients
with transferring assets to qualify for Medicaid.197 Subsequently,
Attorney General Janet Reno announced that the Department of
Justice would not enforce these criminal provisions,198 and courts
have similarly declined to enforce the amended statute that targets
attorneys.199
Given the failed attempts to completely prohibit Medicaid
planning, Congress has instead opted to control costs with more
moderate measures. For example, the means Congress has recently
taken to discourage planning specifically contemplate penalties in
response to those who continue to engage in spend-downs.200
Moreover, the penalty periods do not last indefinitely or completely
eliminate Medicaid eligibility, and there are even some exceptions
to penalty periods applying in the first place.201 The fact that penal
ties are responsive and easily calculated by the applicants indicates
that planning is likely to continue; in fact, new planning techniques
have developed despite Congressional discouragement.202
Those concerned about devastating costs must consider that
the DRA has imposed a longer look-back period and a stricter pen
195. Miller, supra note 83, at 82; see Health Insurance Portability and Accounta
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 217, 110 Stat. 2008 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)) (imposing criminal sanctions against the Medicaid appli
cant in some cases); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4734, 111 Stat.
522 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)) (imposing criminal sanc
tions against those who advise clients about Medicaid planning).
196. Miller, supra note 83, at 81-82.
197. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4734, 111 Stat. 522 (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)).
198. New York State Bar Ass’n v. Reno, 999 F.Supp. 710, 713 (N.D.N.Y 1998)
199. Miller, supra note 83, at 82; see Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773
So.2d 118, 120 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that “Congress . . . eliminated the
criminal penalties against persons transferring the assets”); New York State Bar Ass’n,
999 F.Supp. at 716 (holding that amended Act targeting attorneys was
unconstitutional).
200. Supra pp. 11-12 (noting that penalty periods are determined based on a 60
month lookback period).
201. Supra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text (providing the method for calcu
lating the penalty period and listing some exceptions to incurring a penalty period).
202. Supra Part II.A-B (discussing Medicaid planning and techniques).
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alty period.203 These measures, if effective, require individuals to
spend more of their own assets on their care before they qualify for
Medicaid, even after engaging in a spend-down.204 Considering the
narrow population to which the duty applies, and the stringent rules
imposed by the DRA, it is unlikely that Medicaid would be cata
strophically overburdened; this is especially true bearing in mind
the already large portion of long-term care that Medicaid currently
covers.205
Furthermore, imposing a duty does not necessarily mean that
all proposed Medicaid spend-downs will receive court approval and
thus be implemented. The courts retain the discretion to approve
or reject a suggested spend-down based on their state laws. Courts
will continue to determine the appropriateness of a spend-down in
a manner consistent with their current doctrine. For example, those
proposals in New York and New Jersey are presumptively valid,206
while those proposals in Pennsylvania must meet a higher burden,
since there the court views the duty of the guardian as preserving
the ward’s assets for the ward’s care.207 Consequently, imposing a
duty in this instance will not necessarily increase the overall burden
on Medicaid because not all proposed spend-downs would be
approved.
2. Judicial Costs
Despite the narrowness of the population to which the duty
applies, another criticism to the heightened duty is that it will in
crease the burden on the judiciary as more guardians will be re
quired to propose spend-downs to the courts. Courts are currently
required to authorize guardian-initiated spend-downs.208 However,
the majority of states do not impose a duty on guardians to propose
such spend-downs;209 in fact, California does not even require
203. Supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting the 60 month look-back
period imposed by the DRA).
204. STONE, supra note 23, at 10, 29. See generally Medicaid Rules, supra note 23;
Transfer of Assets, supra note 95.
205. Supra note 55 (noting that Medicaid covers approximately 49% of all longterm care costs).
206. Supra note 133 and accompanying text.
207. Supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
208. Infra Appendix (providing each statute that requires court authorization
before a guardian gifts or disposes of the ward’s property).
209. See infra Appendix. Compare California, New York, and New Jersey (all
allowing guardian spend-downs, but declining to impose a duty) with Pennsylvania and
New Hampshire (declining to impose a duty because impoverishing the ward is not in
the ward’s best interests).
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guardians to initiate such an action.210 Although imposing a blan
ket duty on guardians in these circumstances will certainly busy the
courts and guardians alike, this duty requires no more than is al
ready asked of guardians—or courts, for that matter—to do what is
in the best interest of the ward.211 Furthermore, the courts are the
entities most capable of exercising discretion to determine if the
spend-down is truly in the best interests of the ward based on the
complex Medicaid and guardian laws.212 The benefits received by
the wards certainly outweigh the costs to the judiciary, or the
guardians.
CONCLUSION
This Note illustrates the practical problems involved with
Medicaid eligibility, costs of nursing home care, and a person’s in
stinct to leave assets to his or her loved ones. Imposing a duty on
the guardian accomplishes each of the following: (1) it prevents the
ward from being left in legal limbo; (2) it alleviates equal protection
and fairness concerns; (3) it requires the guardian to act as intended
(as a substitute decision maker) and avoids shifting the guardian’s
duty of care to “interested persons”;213 (4) it strikes a balance be
tween a bright-line rule, preserving necessary flexibility for the
courts, and imposing a duty with little or no change to the current
laws; and (5) it appropriately places the approval of a spend-down
in the hands of the court (the entity most capable of interpreting
the complex body of guardianship law).
Considered separately, each of these goals is persuasive on the
point of why a heightened duty is necessary to guarantee that the
ward is adequately protected. When considered together, these
210. Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that section 2585 doesn’t immunize the conservator from wrongdoing but provides
“that the conservator is not required to propose any action under [S]ection 2580”).
211. In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 913 (N.J. 2004) (adopting the Trott criteria and
holding that guardians may engage in Medicaid planning if the proposed gifts are in the
best interests of the ward). But see In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733
(N.H. 2008); In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2003)
(holding that the guardian has a duty to protect the ward’s assets and apply them to the
ward’s care).
212. See Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn. 1998) (holding that
“[t]he court, and not the conservator” is primarily in charge of caring for the ward’s
estate and “the conservator is but the agent of the court” acting under its supervision
(quoting Probate of Marcus, 509 A.2d 1, 3 (1986))); see also Shippee v. Commercial
Trust Co., 161 A. 775, 777 (Conn. 1932) (holding “that the conservator acts merely as
the agent” and “his duty is to manage the estate of his ward”).
213. CAL. PROB. CODE § 48 (West 2002).
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points provide a compelling argument that imposing a duty is neces
sary to ensure that a guardian is adequately protecting a particu
larly vulnerable person—the ward—from unnecessary asset
depletion.
Perhaps if Donald Domey’s guardians had been required to
petition the court for a spend-down, rather than merely having the
“option,” he would not have exhausted hundreds of thousands of
dollars of assets on the costs of his long-term care. Rather, Don
ald’s guardians could have petitioned the court for approval of a
Medicaid spend-down in which some assets could be divested and
converted into non-countable resources, and some retained to
cover Donald’s care expenses during the penalty period he would
likely incur. As a result, Donald’s benefits would be twofold: (1) he
would have been able to provide the support for his spouse, his
dependent; (2) while also covering the long-term care expenses.
The loss of autonomy accompanying a guardianship is akin to “the
loss of freedom following a criminal conviction.”214 This duty not
only provides more protection for wards facing indefinite nursing
home stays, but also allows wards to dispose of their property more
freely, thereby curing the loss of autonomy that accompanies a
guardianship.
Angelina M. Pargoff*

214. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2012. I would like to
thank the Law Review for working so diligently to prepare my Note for publication,
Hyman Darling for his help in developing this topic and for his guidance, and my family
and friends for their love and support in all of my endeavors.
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APPENDIX215
ALABAMA
Guardian Statute: ALA. CODE § 26-2A-136 (LexisNexis 1975).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
ALASKA
Guardian Statute: ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.200 (2010).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
ARIZONA
Guardian Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5408 (1956).
Is Planning Allowed? Romo v. Kirschner, 889 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (authorizing the conservator to place funds from an in
surance settlement into a trust on behalf of the ward and holding
that “[i]n reality, the trust was created by [the ward],” but finding
the trust to be an available resource, thus rendering the ward ineli
gible for Medicaid).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
ARKANSAS
Guardian Statute: ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-308 (2004).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
CALIFORNIA
Guardian Statute: CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2580-2586 (West 2002).
Is Planning Allowed? Murphy v. Murphy, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784, 789
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the probate code codifies the doc
trine of “substituted judgment” allowing guardians to transfer the
ward’s property as the ward would have if competent to act). See
generally In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511
12, 523-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (recognizing the substituted judg
215. This Appendix provides a sampling of each state’s guardian statutes and
cases discussing guardian-initiated estate planning and Medicaid spend-downs. The
author notes that a more comprehensive analysis and comparison are outside the scope
of this Note, but would be incredibly useful in this area of law (especially given the high
degree of variability and uncertainty).
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ment doctrine and enumerating factors to be considered before au
thorizing guardian transfers of the ward’s assets).
Duty to Plan? Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that Section 2585 does not immunize the con
servator from wrongdoing but provides “that the conservator is not
required to propose any action under [S]ection 2580”).
COLORADO
Guardian Statute: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-411 (West
2011).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
CONNECTICUT
Guardian Statute: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-655 (2011).
Is Planning Allowed? Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Saunders, 724 A.2d
1093, 1106 (Conn. 1999) (holding that a court may authorize a con
servator to transfer a ward’s assets into a Medicaid supplemental
needs trust in order to maintain the ward’s Medicaid eligibility).
Duty to Plan? Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn.
1998) (holding that “[t]he court, and not the conservator is prima
rily” in charge of caring for the ward’s estate and “the conservator
is but the agent of the court” acting under its supervision (quoting
Marcus v. Dep’t of Income Maintenance (In re Probate of Marcus),
509 A.2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1986))).
DELAWARE
Guardian Statute: DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3901, 3923 (2007 &
Supp. 2010).
Is Planning Allowed? Dean v. Del. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs.,
No. Civ. A00A-05-006, 2000 WL 33201237, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct.
Dec. 6, 2000) (emphasizing the court’s dissatisfaction with the con
version of countable resources into income, which is not countable
for the wife’s Medicaid eligibility, but noting that the laws do not
prohibit such a transaction); In re Tarburton, No. C.M. 8578, 1998
WL 326667, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 1998) (appointing the ward’s
daughter as her guardian and noting that the guardian had been
instructed by a social worker as to things she should do to qualify
the ward for Medicaid, including spending the ward’s assets on noncountable assets such as funeral expenses).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
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COLUMBIA

Guardian Statute: D.C. CODE §§ 21-2055, 2070 (LexisNexis 2008).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Tyler, No. 246-00, 2002 WL
1274125, at *13 (D.C. Super. May 30, 2002) (declining to approve
spouse’s request to transfer all assets from Tyler to herself on the
grounds that the spouse failed to establish her need, or any pattern
of gifting by Tyler, and that unlike New York, the D.C. Code does
not recognize the substituted judgment doctrine or specifically au
thorize gifts on behalf of the ward to establish Medicaid eligibility).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
FLORIDA
Guardian Statute: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.441 (West 2010).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So.2d 550,
552-53 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the court may
approve guardian tax and estate planning based on the following
factors: donative intent; what the ward would do if competent; per
manency of the ward’s condition; size of the estate; the needs of the
ward and proposed recipients; whether the recipients of the gifts
vary from who would otherwise inherit the property; and whether
the recipients are dependent upon the ward for support (citations
omitted)).
Duty to Plan? Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118,
121-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the broad discretion of
the courts to authorize guardian initiated estate planning pursuant
to the substituted judgment doctrine and factors enumerated in In
re Guardianship of Bohac but declining to impose a duty on guardi
ans to attempt to engage in such planning).
GEORGIA
Guardian Statute: GA. CODE. ANN. § 29-5-23 (2007 & Supp. 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269, 271 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2008) (approving appointment of a professional conserva
tor to consider whether the ward’s property should be sold and the
proceeds used for her benefit, thus disqualifying her for Medicaid
benefits).
Duty to Plan? Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269, 271 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) (upholding the probate court’s decision to appoint a conser
vator “who could fully analyze the issues associated with a Medi
caid opt-out” and determine whether they are within the ward’s
best interests).
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HAWAII
Guardian Statute: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411 (LexisNexis
2010).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
IDAHO
Guardian Statute: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-408 (2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
ILLINOIS
Guardian Statute: 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-18 (West 2007
& Supp. 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 705
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that courts may authorize guardians
making gifts for estate planning purposes to reduce the taxable es
tate and noting that courts may deny requests when it is possible
that the ward could recover).
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216
17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the guardian breached the fidu
ciary duty owed to the ward by failing to invest the ward’s assets in
a manner so as to qualify her for public aid and causing “unneces
sary dissipation of estate assets”).
INDIANA
Guardian Statute: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-9-4.5 (West 2010).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of E.N., 877 N.E.2d 795,
799-800 (Ind. 2007) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that
the statute does not authorize disposing of the ward’s entire estate,
but rather authorizes applying or disposing of excess assets not
needed for the ward’s future support).
Duty to Plan? First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891
N.E.2d 604, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “it is clear that a
guardian’s duties include estate planning for its protected person,
while mindful of the best interests of his ward, spouse or family”
(emphasis added)).
IOWA
Guardian Statute: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.647, 633.668 (West
2003).
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Brice’s Guardianship, 8 N.W.2d 576,
578-79 (Iowa 1943) (holding that the probate court possesses broad
powers to manage the ward’s estate including the authority to ap
prove gifts from the ward to one whom no duty of support is owed
and citing several factors to be considered before such gifts are
approved).
Duty to Plan? In re Brice’s Guardianship, 8 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa
1943) (citing New York case law and holding that “[t]he controlling
principle is that the court will act with reference to the incompetent
and for his benefit as he would probably have acted if sane” (em
phasis added)).
KANSAS
Guardian Statute: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3078 (2005).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Watkins, 947 P.2d 45, 48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that conser
vators may establish Medicaid supplemental needs trusts pursuant
to both the state and federal law).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
KENTUCKY
Guardian Statute: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.137, 387.125,
387.065 (LexisNexis 2010).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
LOUISIANA
Guardian Statute: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1022-1024 (West
2008); LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 4566 (West Supp. 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? Sanders v. Pilley, 684 So.2d 460, 466 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that a trust created by the ward and his guard
ian was not considered an asset for determining the ward’s Medi
caid eligibility and stating that “[the court does] not believe that
Congress intended through its enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) to
force a disabled individual . . . to exhaust funds intended to improve
his qualify of life before seeking Medicaid assistance”).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MAINE
Guardian Statute: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, §§ 5 408, 425
(West Supp. 2010).
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Conservatorship of Jackson, 721 A.2d
177, 179-80 (Me. 1998) (holding that the conservator had authority
to convey the ward’s home to his disabled child as retaining a life
estate, renting the home, or selling it outright would all produce
assets of value for the ward rendering him ineligible for Medicaid).
Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Bragdon, 875 A.2d 697, 700 (Me.
2005) (holding that “[a] conservator has a duty to act as a fiduciary
and observe the standards of care applicable to trustees”).
MARYLAND
Guardian Statute: MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-213, 15
102 (LexisNexis 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MASSACHUSETTS
Guardian Statute: MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5-407 (2010).
Is Planning Allowed? Strange v. Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 709
(Mass. 1970) (holding that just because an individual is a ward he
should not be deprived of the ability to engage in estate planning
and as a result be forced into “favoring the taxing authorities over
the best interests of his estate”).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MICHIGAN
Guardian Statute: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5407 (West
2002).
Is Planning Allowed? Nat’l Bank of Detroit v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,
614 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the conserva
tor’s establishment of a trust on behalf of the ward but finding the
trust to be a countable asset rendering the ward ineligible for
Medicaid).
Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Hromek, No. 203957, 1998 WL
1988943, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1998) (concluding that the
ward needed proceeds from the sale of her stock to cover her care
expenses, authorizing the conservator’s sale of the stock, and hold
ing that “this statute does not create an absolute duty to preserve
the ward’s estate plan”).
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MINNESOTA
Guardian Statute: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411 (West Supp.
2011).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Kindt, 542 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (affirming the guardian’s creation of a trust on behalf of
the ward but holding that the trust was an available asset to the
ward thus defeating Medicaid eligibility).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MISSISSIPPI
Guardian Statute: MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-38 (West 2007).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MISSOURI
Guardian Statute: MO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 475.091, .092, .094
(West 2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
MONTANA
Guardian Statute: MONT. CODE. ANN. § 72-5-421 (2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
NEBRASKA
Guardian Statute: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2637 (LexisNexis
2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
NEVADA
Guardian Statute: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.113, .125 (LexisNexis 2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Guardian Statute: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (West 2004).
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729,
734 (N.H. 2008) (holding that “the probate court may authorize the
guardian” to engage in estate planning for the ward to minimize tax
consequences).
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Phuong Phi Thi Luong, 951
A.2d 136, 141 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the statute’s legislative in
tent is “clear on its face” and a guardian may engage in estate plan
ning for their ward); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729,
733-34 (N.H. 2008) (holding that the statute gives guardians the op
tion to engage in estate planning but does not impose a duty to do
so unless the ward owes a duty of support to an individual and
“there are ‘more than sufficient’ resources” to provide for the
ward).
NEW JERSEY
Guardian Statute: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50, -58 (West 2007).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 913 (N.J. 2004)
(adopting the Trott criteria and holding that guardians may engage
in Medicaid planning if the proposed gifts are in the best interests
of the ward and “such ‘as the ward might have been expected to
make’”); In re Trott, 288 A.2d 303, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1972) (allowing a guardian to make gifts from the ward’s estate to
reduce estate taxes and enumerating five criteria that must be
established).
Duty to Plan? In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004) (declining
to impose a duty, but establishing a presumption in favor of “spend
down[s] . . . on . . . ground[s] that a reasonable and competent per
son ‘would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as
opposed to his family’” (quoting In re Shah, 95 N.Y.S2d 148, 160
(N.Y. 2000))).
NEW MEXICO
Guardian Statute: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-402.1 (West 2003).
Is Planning Allowed? Kegel v. New Mexico Human Serv. Dep’t,
830 P.2d 563, 567 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the trust
was established by the conservator on behalf of his ward and there
fore constituted an available asset for Medicaid eligibility
purposes).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
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NEW YORK
Guardian Statute: N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (McKinney
2006 & Supp. 2012).
Is Planning Allowed? In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332 (App. Div.
1996) (holding that “guardians have the authority to effect transfers
of assets for the purpose of rendering incapacitated persons Medi
caid eligible” and noting that a contrary result deprives wards of
options available to competent persons).
Duty to Plan? In re Shah 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (N.Y. 2000) (de
clining to impose a duty but agreeing that “any person [comatose
and with limited private insurance benefits] would prefer that the
costs of his care be paid by the State, as opposed to his family”).
NORTH CAROLINA
Guardian Statute: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35A-1251, -1335, -1340
(2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
NORTH DAKOTA
Guardian Statute: N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-08 (LexisNexis
2010).
Is Planning Allowed? Linser v. Off. of Att’y Gen., 672 N.W.2d 643,
649 (N.D. 2003) (noting that the ward’s guardian established a spe
cial needs trust as a means of qualifying the ward for Medicaid, but
holding that the trust assets were available to the ward therefore
disqualifying him from eligibility).
Duty to Plan? Reinholdt v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Serv.,
760 N.W.2d 101, 106 (N.D. 2009) (holding that the ward’s guardians
breached their fiduciary duty to her by relinquishing her right to all
of the marital assets in a divorce action as a means of qualifying the
ward for Medicaid).
OHIO
Guardian Statute: OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2111.50 (West 2005).
Is Planning Allowed? Vieth v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Serv.,
No. 08AP-635, 2009 WL 2331870, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30,
2009) (holding that marital assets which were used by the ward’s
wife to purchase annuities for the sole benefit of the community
spouse were not countable resources for Medicaid eligibility
purposes).
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Duty to Plan? In re Ewanicky, No. 81742, 2003 WL 21469181, at *2
4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2003) (holding that the guardian was per
sonally liable to the ward’s estate for damages incurred when the
guardian failed to pay the ward’s health care expenses and timely
file for Medicaid assistance).
OKLAHOMA
Guardian Statute: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-121 (West 2009).
Is Planning Allowed? McAlary v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human
Serv., 233 P.3d 399, 406 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the
trust established by the wards’ daughter was an available resource
to the wards rendering them ineligible for Medicaid as the trust was
funded by the wards’ own money and the wards applied for Medi
caid just one day after the funds were placed in the trust).
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Lee, 982 P.2d 539, 541 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1999) (finding that the ward resided in a nursing home
with income insufficient to meet her expenses and holding that the
guardian had “both the authority and duty to retrieve assets from
[the ward’s trust] for [her] benefit and to the extent necessary to
provide for [her] needs” (emphasis added))
OREGON
Guardian Statute: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.420-450 (West
2009).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Baxter, 874 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) (declining to decide whether Oregon statutes authorize
Medicaid planning and refusing to approve guardian creation of a
trust to render ward Medicaid eligible because ward was not
incapacitated).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
PENNSYLVANIA
Guardian Statute: 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (West 2005).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309,
at *6 (Pa. Com. Pl. March 19, 2003) (noting that “[i]t is plainly per
missible for guardians in Pennsylvania to perform estate planning
and to make distributions from estates when such actions are in the
best interests of the ward”).
Duty to Plan? In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *6
(Pa. Com. Pl. March 19, 2003) (declining to authorize a guardian
proposed Medicaid spend-down of the ward’s assets, refusing to
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adopt a presumption that the ward’s intent was to “sacrifice . . . her
own comfort for the benefit of others,” and noting that “most peo
ple seek to enjoy the benefits of their own property for as long as
possible”); Pomroy v. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 750 A.2d 395, 398
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that the law clearly obligates a fi
duciary to “use [the ward’s] resources . . . prior to receiving any
further governmental assistance”).
RHODE ISLAND
Guardian Statute: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-37.1 (1995 & Supp.
2010).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
SOUTH CAROLINA
Guardian Statute: S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-408 (West 2009).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Guardian Statute: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420 (2004).
Is Planning Allowed? Striegel v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
515 N.W.2d 245, 246 (S.D. 1994) (noting that the guardian was
given authority to transfer the ward’s assets into a trust, but holding
that Medicaid is not to be used as an estate planning tool, therefore
the assets are available to the ward and the ward is ineligible for
Medicaid benefits).
Duty to Plan? Meyer v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 581
N.W.2d, 151, 157-58 (S.D. 1998) (emphasizing that Medicaid is “not
free insurance coverage for those who have resources available to
them to pay their medical expenses”).
TENNESSEE
Guardian Statute: TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-122 (2007).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Conservatorship of Childs, No. M2008
02481-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 51740, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 5,
2011) (noting that the conservator received Medicaid approval for
the ward and after the trial court granted conservator’s motion to
liquidate the ward’s insurance policies to apply to proceeds to fu
neral and burial arrangements (non-countable assets)).
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Duty to Plan? Grahl v. Davis, 971 S.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Tenn. 1998)
(holding that conservators owe a fiduciary duty to their wards but
that the conservators primary duty is to preserve the estate of the
ward).
TEXAS
Guardian Statute: TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 774 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2010).
Is Planning Allowed? Paredes v. Alexander, No. 03-08427-C, 2004
WL 3383446 (Tex. Dist. Oct. 18, 2004) (creating a special needs
trust on behalf of the ward).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
UTAH
Guardian Statute: UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-408 (LexisNexis 1993
& Supp. 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998)
(noting that after the ward received Medicaid, conservators were
appointed and authorized to place $150,000 of insurance funds in a
special needs trust on the ward’s behalf).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
VERMONT
Guardian Statute: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3069 (2010).
Is Planning Allowed? Samis v. Samis, 22 A.3d 444, 445, 450 (Vt.
2011) (noting that the lower court approved a stipulation ap
pointing a guardian and providing that the guardian and husband of
the ward would cooperate in financial and Medicaid planning on
her behalf as her resources might be insufficient to provide for her
care).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
VIRGINIA
Guardian Statute: VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1024 (2005).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Rudwick, No. 01-633, 2002 WL
31730757, *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2002) (holding that the conserva
tor is authorized to revoke the ward’s trust based on board powers
granted to conservators in the statutory scheme as well as the nonpreclusive language of the trust instrument).
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
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WASHINGTON
Guardian Statute: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.140 (West 2006
& Supp. 2011).
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Sullivan, No. 49266-7-I, 2003
WL 1742631, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003) (noting that
“§11.92.140 authorizes a guardian to determine an incapacitated
person’s intent regarding his or her estate, including the intent to
qualify for federal and state medical assistance programs” (emphasis
added)).
Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Sullivan, No. 49266-7-I, 2003 WL
1742631, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding that the
professional guardian owed a duty to represent the ward’s best in
terests and she violated this duty by failing to ascertain the ward’s
intent and by attempting to block the property conveyance which
would “result[ ] in no benefit to her ward due to his status as a
Medicaid recipient” as retaining the property would likely render
the ward Medicaid ineligible).
WEST VIRGINIA
Guardian Statute: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-7 (LexisNexis
2010).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
WISCONSIN
Guardian Statute: WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 54.20-.21 (West 2008).
Is Planning Allowed? A.G. v. Dept. of Human Servs. (In re Guardi
anship of Scott G.G.), 659 N.W.2d 438, 443-44 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that a court may authorize the guardian to place the
ward’s assets into a Medicaid Payback Trust in accordance with
Wisconsin and federal statutes and noting the ward’s incompetency
should not prevent him from taking advantage of the extra re
sources that can flow from the trust).
Duty to Plan? V.D.H. v. Circuit Court (In re Guardianship of
F.E.H.), 453 N.W.2d 882, 885-87 (Wis. 1990) (noting that the guard
ian has an affirmative duty to manage a ward’s estate in the ward’s
best interests and holding that the lower court abused its discretion
by failing to consider whether a guardian could make a transfer to
benefit the ward, his estate, or members of his immediate family).

2012]

MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS

WYOMING
Guardian Statute: WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-3-607, -801 (2011).
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
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